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Abstract
Many recent works demonstrated that Deep Learning models
are vulnerable to adversarial examples.Fortunately, generat-
ing adversarial examples usually requires white-box access to
the victim model, and the attacker can only access the APIs
opened by cloud platforms. Thus, keeping models in the cloud
can usually give a (false) sense of security.Unfortunately,
cloud-based image classification service is not robust to sim-
ple transformations such as Gaussian Noise, Salt-and-Pepper
Noise, Rotation and Monochromatization. In this paper,(1)
we propose one novel attack method called Image Fusion(IF)
attack, which achieve a high bypass rate,can be implemented
only with OpenCV and is difficult to defend; and (2) we
make the first attempt to conduct an extensive empirical study
of Simple Transformation (ST) attacks against real-world
cloud-based classification services. Through evaluations on
four popular cloud platforms including Amazon, Google, Mi-
crosoft, Clarifai, we demonstrate that ST attack has a success
rate of approximately 100% except Amazon approximately
50%, IF attack have a success rate over 98% among different
classification services. (3) We discuss the possible defenses to
address these security challenges.Experiments show that our
defense technology can effectively defend known ST attacks.
1 Introduction
In recent years, Deep Learning(DL) techniques have been
extensively deployed for computer vision tasks, particularly
visual classification problems, where new algorithms re-
ported to achieve or even surpass the human performance
[8,11,13,17,19]. Success of DL algorithms has led to an explo-
sion in demand. To further broaden and simplify the use of DL
algorithms, cloud-based services offered by Amazon, Google,
Microsoft, Clarifai, and others to offer various computer vi-
sion related services including image auto-classification, ob-
ject identification and illegal image detection. Thus, users and
companies can readily benefit from DL applications without
having to train or host their own models.
[20] discovered an intriguing properties of DL models
in the context of image classification for the first time. They
showed that despite the state-of-the-art DL models are surpris-
ingly susceptible to adversarial attacks in the form of small
perturbations to images that remain (almost) imperceptible
to human vision system. These perturbations are found by
optimizing the input to maximize the prediction error and the
images modified by these perturbations are called as adver-
sarial example. The profound implications of these results
triggered a wide interest of researchers in adversarial attacks
and their defenses for deep learning in general.The initially
involved computer vision task is image classification. For that,
a variety of attacking methods have been proposed, such as
L-BFGS of [20], FGSM of [6], PGD of [15],Deepfool of [16]
,C&W of [4] and so on.
Fortunately, generating adversarial examples usually re-
quires white-box access to the victim model, and real-world
cloud-based image classification services are more complex
than white-box classifier, the architecture and parameters of
DL models on cloud platforms cannot be obtained by the at-
tacker. The attacker can only access the APIs opened by cloud
platforms. Thus, keeping models in the cloud can usually give
a (false) sense of security. Unfortunately, a lot of experiments
have proved that attackers can successfully deceive cloud-
based DL models without knowing the type, structure and
parameters of the DL models [9, 12, 23].
In general, in terms of applications, research of adversarial
example attacks against cloud vision services can be grouped
into three main categories: query-based attacks, transfer learn-
ing attacks and spatial transformation attacks. Query-based
attacks are typical black-box attacks, attackers do not have
the prior knowledge and get inner information of DL models
through hundreds of thousands of queries to successfully gen-
erate an adversarial example [18].In [10], thousands of queries
are required for low-resolution images. For high-resolution
images, it still takes tens of thousands of times. For example,
they achieves a 95.5% success rate with a mean of 104342
queries to the black-box classifier. In a real attack, the cost
of launching so many requests is very high.Transfer learning
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attacks are first examined by [20], which study the transfer-
ability between different models trained over the same dataset.
[14] propose novel ensemble-based approaches to generate
adversarial example . Their approaches enable a large portion
of targeted adversarial example to transfer among multiple
models for the first time.However, transfer learning attacks
have strong limitations, depending on the collection of enough
open source models, but for example, there are not enough
open source models for pornographic and violent image recog-
nition.
Spatial transformation is a different type of perturbation, as
opposed to manipulating the pixel values directly as in prior
works [3, 4, 7, 10, 16, 20]. Perturbations generated through
spatial transformation could result in large Lp distance mea-
sures, but experiments show that such spatially transformed
adversarial examples are perceptually realistic and more dif-
ficult to defend against with existing defense systems. This
potentially provides a new direction in adversarial example
generation and the design of corresponding defenses [22]. [9]
found that adding an average of 14.25% impulse noise is
enough to deceive the Google’s Cloud Vision API. [23] found
spatial transformation attacks can evade explicit content de-
tection while still preserving their sexual appeal, even though
the distortions and noise introduced are clearly observable to
humans.
We further extend the spatial transformation attack, and
choose the four methods which have the lowest cost to imple-
ment. These methods can be implemented without any Deep
Learning knowledge and only need a few lines of OpenCV
code, but the attack effect is very remarkable. Compared with
previous work [22], these methods are more threatening,we
call it Simple Transformation (ST) attacks,including Gaussian
Noise, Salt-and-Pepper Noise, Rotation and Monochromati-
zation. To the best of our knowledge, no extensive empirical
study has yet been conducted to black-box attacks and de-
fences against real-world cloud-based image classification
services. We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• We propose one novel attack methods, Image Fusion(IF)
attack ,which achieve a high bypass rate.Within our
known range, there is no effective means of protection.
• We make the first attempt to conduct an extensive
empirical study of Simple Transformation(ST) attacks
against real-world cloud-based image classifier services.
Through evaluations on four popular cloud platforms in-
cluding Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Clarifai, we demon-
strate that our ST attack has a success rate of approx-
imately 100%, IF attack have a success rate over 98%
among different classifier services.
• We discuss the possible defenses to address these secu-
rity challenges in cloud-based classifier services.Our pro-
tection technology is mainly divided into model training
stage and image preprocessing stage. Experiments show
that our defense technology can effectively resist known
ST attacks, such as Gaussian Noise, Salt-and-Pepper
Noise, Rotation, and Monochromatization.Through ex-
periments, we prove how to choose different filters in
the face of different noises, and how to choose the pa-
rameters of different filters.
2 Theat model and criterion
2.1 Threat Model
In this paper, we assume that the attacker can only access the
APIs opened by cloud platforms, and get inner information of
DL models through limited queries to generate an adversarial
example.Without any access to the training data, model, or
any other prior knowledge, is a real black-box attack.
2.2 Criterion and Evaluation
The same with [12] ,We choose top-1 misclassification as our
criterion, which means that our attack is successful if the label
with the highest probability generated by the neural networks
differs from the correct label.
We assume the original input is O, the adversarial example
is ADV . For an RGB image (m×n×3), (x,y,b) is a coordi-
nate of an image for channel b(06 b6 2) at location (x,y).
We use Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) [1] to measure
the quality of images.
PSNR = 10log10(MAX2/MSE) (1)
where MAX = 255, MSE is the mean square error.
MSE =
1
mn∗3 ∗
2
∑
b=0
n
∑
i=1
m
∑
j=1
||ADV (i, j,b)−O(i, j,b)||2 (2)
Usually, values for the PSNR are considered between 20
and 40 dB, (higher is better) [2].
We use structural similarity (SSIM) index to measure image
similarity, the details of how to compute SSIM can be found
in [21].Values for the SSIM are considered good between 0.5
and 1.0, (higher is better).
3 Black-box attack algorithms
3.1 Problem Definition
A real-world cloud-based image classifier service is a function
F(x) = y that accepts an input image x and produces an output
y. F(.) assigns the label C(x) = argmaxi F(x)i to the input x.
Original input is O, the adversarial example is ADV and ε
is the perturbation.
Adversarial example is defined as:
ADV = O+ ε (3)
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(a) Origin image (b) Gaussian Noise (c) Monochromatization
Figure 1: Illustration of the attack against Google Images Search.Figure 1(a) is origin image ,search result is a cat and Figure
1(b) is Gaussian Noise, search result is a flesh,Figure 1(c) is Monochromatization, search result is a rat.
We make a black-box untargeted attack against real-world
cloud-based classifier services F(x):
C(ADV ) 6=C(O) (4)
We also assume that we are given a suitable loss func-
tion L(θ,x,y),for instance the cross-entropy loss for a neural
network. As usual, θ ∈ Rp is the set of model parameters.
3.2 Simple Transformation
Prior work such as [9] only discussed Salt-and-Pepper Noise
on Google vision APIs . [23] report the first systematic study
on the real-world adversarial images and their use in online
illicit promotions which belong to image detectors. In the
following, we explore the effect of 4 different ST attacks
on the classifier , including Gaussian Noise, Salt-and-Pepper
Noise, Rotation, and Monochromatization. All these image
processing techniques are implemented with Python libraries,
such as Skimage1 and OpenCV2.
3.2.1 Gaussian Noise and Salt-and-Pepper Noise
Gaussian Noise is a kind of noise whose distribution satisfies
Gaussian distribution. Noise satisfies Gaussian distribution
which mean and var represent the mean and variance, Gaus-
sian Noise is computed as follows:
ADV = clip(O+Noise),Noise∼ N (mean,var2) (5)
For an RGB image (m×n×3), (x,y,b) is a coordinate of an
image for channel b(0 6 b 6 2) at location (x,y). Salt-and-
Pepper Noise is computed as follows:
ADVi, j,k =
 0 with probability
amount
2
Oi, j,k with probability 1−amount
255 with probability amount2
(6)
Parameter amount is between 0 to 1.0, which controls how
many pixels become noise.
1https://scikit-image.org/
2https://opencv.org/
3.2.2 Rotation
Rotation refers to revolving the image clockwise, centering
on the center of the original image, to get a new image, and
filling the edges of the image with black. Parameter degree
controls the angle of rotation.
3.2.3 Monochromatization
Monochromatization refers to the preservation of only one
channel data in RGB.
ADVi, j,k =
{
Oi, j,k k is the selected channel
0
(7)
Grayscale image is a special Monochromatization attack.
ADV = R∗0.299+G∗0.587+B∗0.114 (8)
3.3 Image Fusion
Image Fusion attack is a technique that applies a certain back-
ground image B to the original image O. B often contains rich
high-frequency signals.So similar to noising, this technique
makes image structural information difficult to extract.
ADV = α∗O+(1−α)∗B (9)
α is a hyperparameter between 0.0 and 1.0.
Figure 4 shows the API’s output label with the highest
confidence score, for the original image O and adversarial ex-
ample ADV . As can be seen, unlike O, the API wrongly labels
ADV , despite that the objects in ADV are easily recognizable.
We use the output of the first layer convolution of VGG19
[19] to visualize the process of image fusion attack in Figure
12. α is set to 0.2. We can find that although the proportion
of the original image O is only 0.2, the image can still be
distinguished by the human naked eye as a cat. But in the
visualization of convolution feature map, we can find that
the features extracted by convolution already contain a large
amount information of background image B , and the feature
information of the original image has been seriously damaged.
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(a) Origin (b) var = 0.05 (c) amount = 0.01 (d) degree = 45
(e) color = gray (f) color = green (g) color = red (h) color = blue
Figure 2: Illustration of ST attacks on a cat image.Figure 2(a) is origin image,Figure 2(b) is Gaussian Noise,Figure 2(c) is
Salt-and-Pepper Noise,Figure 2(d) is Rotation and Figure 2(e)2(f)2(g)2(h) is Monochromatization.
(a) Origin (b) var = 0.05 (c) amount = 0.01 (d) degree = 45
(e) color = gray (f) color = green (g) color = red (h) color = blue
Figure 3: Features of distorted images extracted by VGG19’s first convolutional layer (after max pooling).Figure 3(a) is origin
image,Figure 3(b) is Gaussian Noise,Figure 3(c) is Salt-and-Pepper Noise,Figure 3(d) is Rotation and Figure 3(e)3(f)3(g)3(h) is
Monochromatization.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the Image Fusion attack on Clarifai Vision API,the hyperparameter of α is 0.5. By applying a certain
background image B to the original image O, we can force the API to output completely different labels. Captions are the
labels with the highest confidence returned by the API.For adversarial example ADV , none of the output labels are related to
corresponding original images. The cat image is chosen from the ImageNet val dataset.
4 Defenses
Defense adversarial examples is a huge system engineering,
involving at least two stages: model training and image pre-
processing.
4.1 Model training
[6] propose adversarial training to improve the robustness
of deep learning model. Retraining the model with new train-
ing data may be very helpful. In addition, we can find that
ST attack is essentially a common image transformation
method. It can improve the robustness of the model by adding
Random Rotation, Random Grayscale, Random Horizontal
Flip,Random Resize and Crop and Noise filter in the data aug-
mentation stage.We will focus on the introduction of Random
Rotation and Random Grayscale.
4.1.1 Random rotation
In the training process of the model, the robustness of the
model against Rotation attack can be improved by randomly
rotating the image at a certain angle. The angle range of
rotation is usually set as a parameter of random rotation.
4.1.2 Random grayscale
Adding gray images to training samples can improve the
model’s ability to resist Monochromatization attack. Gener-
ally, the probability of randomly adding gray image is set to
p.
4.2 Image preprocessing
The system’s robustness can be readily improved by applying
a noise filter on the inputs to defense Gaussian Noise and
Salt-and-Pepper Noise attacks, without the need for updating
the image analysis algorithms.
4.2.1 Noise filter
Gauss Filter and Median Filter are the most commonly used
noise filters. We focus on these two filters.The industry often
uses these two filters because they have stable and efficient
implementations in OpenCV.
Gauss Filter is a linear smoothing filter, which is suitable
for removing gaussian noise and is widely used in image
processing. Generally speaking, Gauss filtering is the pro-
cess of weighted averaging of the whole image. The value
of each pixel is obtained by weighted averaging of its own
and other pixel values in its neighborhood. The specific oper-
ation of Gauss Filter is to scan every pixel in the image with
a template (or convolution, mask), and replace the value of
the central pixel of the template with the weighted average
gray value of the pixels in the neighborhood determined by
the template.Generally, the size of convolution kernel ksize is
used as the parameter of Gauss Filter.Gauss filter is suitable
for processing gaussian noise
Median Filter is a non-linear smoothing technique. It sets
the gray value of each pixel to the median value of the gray
value of all pixels in a neighborhood window of the point, so
that the surrounding pixels are close to the true value, thus
eliminating isolated noise points.The size of window ksize
is used as the parameter of Median Filter.Median Filter is
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suitable for processing Salt-and-Pepper Noise.
4.2.2 Grayscale
Grayscale can resist monochromatization attack, which refers
to the preservation of only one channel data in RGB or the
direct conversion of images into gray-scale images.Usually
the picture is a color or gray image, gray image has only one
color channel, and color image usually has three RGB color
channels. Although the attack image has three color channels,
only one channel has data, so it can be directly judged as
cheating, or directly converted into a gray image of a channel.
5 Experimental evaluation
5.1 Simple Transformation and Image Fusion
Attacks
5.1.1 Datasets
100 cat images and 100 other animal images are selected from
the ImageNet val set.Every input image is clipped to the size
of 224×224×3, where 3 is the number of RGB channels. The
RGB value of the image is between 0 and 255.We use these
100 images of cats as original images to generate adversarial
examples and make a black-box untargeted attack against
real-world cloud-based image classifier services .We choose
top-1 misclassification as our criterion, which means that our
attack is successful if the label with the highest probability
generated by the cloud-based image classifier service differs
from the correct label "cat". We count the number of top-1
misclassification to calculate the escape rate.
Table 1: Correct label by cloud APIs
Platforms Cat Images Other Animals All Images
Amazon 99/100 98/100 197/200
Google 97/100 100/100 197/200
Microsoft 58/100 98/100 156/200
Clarifai 97/100 98/100 195/200
According to Table 1, we can learn that Amazon and
Google, which label 98.5% of all images correctly, have done
a better job than other cloud platforms.
5.1.2 Simple Transformation
To further understand the effectiveness of ST attacks, we apply
4 ST attacks such as Gaussian Noise,Salt-and-Pepper Noise,
Rotation and Monochromatization, each with 4 different set-
tings (such as angle for rotation, density of noise, etc., see
Table 2).
The escape rates of four ST attacks against Ama-
zon,Google,Microsoft and Clarifai are shown in Figure 5.
Table 2: Parameters used in 4 types of distortions
Method L1 L2 L3 L4
Gaussian Noise(var) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Rotation(degree) 45 90 135 180
Salt-and-Pepper Noise(amount) 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Monochromatization(color) blue green red gray
As we can see from Figure 5, with proper settings, these
four ST attacks are able to effectively degrade the perfor-
mance of cloud-based image classification services including
Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Clarifai. Gaussian Noise and
Salt-and-Pepper Noise attacks have a success rate of approx-
imately 100% except Amazon. According to Figure 5, we
can learn that Amazon , which label above 50% of all images
of 4 ST attacks correctly, have done a better job than other
cloud platforms. We speculate that Amazon has done a lot of
work in image preprocessing to improve the robustness of the
whole service.
5.1.3 Image Fusion
The image fusion parameter α represents the proportion of the
original image O in the newly generated image ADV .When
α = 1, it is equivalent to ADV = O. The fusion image is
exactly the same as the original image, so SSIM = 1 and
PSNR is infinity.We launch Image Fusion attack against the
images in the val dataset, and the fusion parameter α range
from 0.2 to 1.0. As shown in the Figure 6, we can find that
α controls image quality and similarity,image quality and
similarity improve as the parameter increases.
The escape rates of Image Fusion attack are shown in Fig-
ure 7. From Figure 7, we know that all the cloud-based image
classifier services are vulnerable to Image Fusion attacks . α
controls the escape rate and the escape rate decreases as the
parameter increases , when α is between 0.1 and 0.2,Image
Fusion attack has a success rate of approximately 100%.
5.2 Defenses
5.2.1 Datasets
In the experimental stage, it is unrealistic to obtain the image
classification model of cloud service providers directly and
retrain it. In order to simulate the real environment as much as
possible, we used VGG19 model to retrain our image classifi-
cation model on the train and val dataset of ImageNet.Detailed
description of data set in Table 3.
5.2.2 Data augmentation and noise filter
We choose top-1 accuracy as our criterion and high accuracy
means effective defense. We define top-1 accuracy as our
defense rates.Every input image is clipped to the size of 224×
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(a) Amazon (b) Google
(c) Microsoft (d) Clarifai
Figure 5: The escape rates of four ST attacks against Amazon,Google,Microsoft and Clarifai
(a) PSNR (b) SSIM
Figure 6: We show the PSNR and SSIM of Image Fusion attack.The images are from our val datasets.α controls image quality
and similarity,image quality and similarity improve as the parameter increases.When α= 1, it is equivalent to ADV = O. The
fusion image is exactly the same as the original image, so SSIM = 1 and PSNR is infinity. For display convenience, PSNR is
uniformly expressed as 40.
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Figure 7: We increase α from 0.1 to 0.7, the figure records
the escape rates of IF attack against cloud-based image classi-
fication services under different α
Table 3: Training and val images of our defenses. A total of
four kinds of animal pictures in the ImageNet data set are
used. The training set size of each animal is 1300 and the val
set size is 50.
Label ID Class Name Train images Val images
0 tench 1300 50
1 goldfish 1300 50
2 white shark 1300 50
283 cat 1300 50
224×3, where 3 is the number of RGB channels. The RGB
value of the image is between 0 and 255.
During the training phase, we use data augmentation tech-
niques and a noise filter on the inputs during the image pre-
processing phase.Std is short for Standard VGG19 retrained
by us,DA is short for Data Augmentation and NF is short for
Noise Filter.Std+DA+NF means that we use data augmenta-
tion during the training phase and a noise filter on the inputs
during the image preprocessing phase.Top-1 accuracy of Std
is 99.5%,while Std+DA is 98.5%.It can be considered that the
accuracy of the model after data enhancement is acceptable.
We focus on the parameters of the noise filter in image
preprocessing.We use the image in the val dataset to launch
Gaussian Noise attack and Salt-and-Pepper Noise, and then
denoise by filter. The parameter of Gaussian Noise attack are
var, parameter of Salt-and-Pepper Noise attack is amount,and
the parameter of the noise filter are ksize.
We increase var of Gaussian Noise Attack from 0.1 to
0.4,ksize of the Gauss Filter from 3 to 17, the Figure 8(a)
records the PSNR and the Figure 8(b) records the SSIM under
different parameters.When the parameters var of Gaussian
Noise Attack are the same, increasing the window size pa-
rameters ksize of the Gauss Filter will improve the image
similarity and the image quality.
From Figure 9(a), we can see that facing the same Gaussian
Noise, the larger the window size ksize of the Gauss Filter, the
better the filtering effect and the higher the defense rate.From
Figure 9(a) and Figure 9(b), we can see that when the attack
parameters of Gaussian Noise are the same, the defense rate
of Gauss Filter is higher than that of Median Filter, and the
Gauss Filter with ksize = 29 has the best protective effect
against different values of Gaussian Noise.
From Figure 9(c) and Figure 9(d), we can see that when
the attack parameters of Salt-and-Pepper Noise are the same,
the defense rate of Median Filter is higher than that of Gauss
Filter, and the Median Filter with ksize = 11 has the best
protective effect against different values of Salt-and-Pepper
Noise.
(a) PSNR
(b) SSIM
Figure 8: We increase var of Gaussian Noise Attack from
0.1 to 0.4, ksize of the Gauss Filter from 3 to 17, the Figure
8(a) records the PSNR and the Figure 8(b) records the SSIM
under different parameters.When the parameters var of Gaus-
sian Noise Attack are the same, increasing the window size
parameters ksize of the Gauss Filter will improve the image
similarity and the image quality.
As can be seen from Figure 10(a) and Figure 10(c),the
ability of the model to defense Gaussian Noise and Salt-
and-Pepper Noise attacks can be improved by using the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9: Defense rate under different noise and different noise filter parameters.
Table 4: Methods and parameters of defenses during the training and image preprocessing phase.
Stage Method Parameters
Training
Random Rotation(degree range) (0,360)
Random Grayscale(probability) 0.5
Random Horizontal Flip(probability) 0.5
Random Resize and Crop(image size) 224
Gauss Filter(ksize) 29
Median Filter(ksize) 11
Image preprocessing Median Filter(ksize) 11Grayscale N/A
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(a) Gaussian Noise (b) Rotation
(c) Salt-and-Pepper Noise (d) Monochromatization
Figure 10: The defense rates of four ST attacks.Figure 10(a) show the defense rates of Gaussian Noise, Figure 10(b) show the
defense rates of Rotation,Figure 10(c) show the defense rates of Salt-and-Pepper Noise and Figure 10(d) show the defense rates
of Monochromatization.Lines Std and Std+NF,Std+DA and Std+DA+NF coincide in Figure 10(b).
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noise filter.We can see from Figure 10(b) that data aug-
mentation improves the ability to defense Rotation at-
tacks.Simultaneous use of data enhancement and noise filter
can defense Monochromatization attacks,which can be seen
from Figure 10(d).In addition, lines Std and Std+NF,Std+DA
and Std+DA+NF coincide in Figure 10(b).It can be seen that
image denoising has no effect on rotation attack.
Unfortunately, our IF attack, as shown in the Figure 11, has
almost no defensive effect improvement in the face of data
augmentation and image preprocessing.
Figure 11: The defense rates of IF attacks under different
a.There is almost no defensive effect improvement in the face
of data augmentation and image preprocessing
6 Discussion
6.1 Effect of Attacks
Our research shows that ST and IF attacks can reduce the ac-
curacy of mainstream image classification services in varying
degrees. To make matters worse, for any image classification
service, we can find a way that can be almost 100% bypassed
as shown in Table 5. As shown in the Figure 1, we can attack
image search in the same way.
Table 5: Escape rates of cloud-based detectors attack.
Platforms ST IF
Amazon 0.54 0.98
Google 0.98 0.98
Microsoft 1.0 1.0
Clarifai 0.98 0.98
6.2 Effect of Defenses
Defense adversarial examples is a huge system engineering,
involving at least two stages: model training and image pre-
processing.Experiments show that our defense technology can
effectively resist known ST attacks, such as Gaussian Noise,
Salt-and-Pepper Noise, Rotation, and Monochromatization.
Table 6: Defense rates of ST attack.Our defense technology
can raise the defense rate to more than 80%,we have used the
black line to thicken it.
Attack Without Defense With Defense
Gaussian Noise 0.60 0.80
Rotation 0.70 0.80
Salt-and-Pepper Noise 0.50 0.95
Monochromatization 0.4 0.80
Image Fusion 0.25 0.40
Although all the above efforts can only solve some prob-
lems, chatting is better than nothing.The experimental data
show that our defense method improves the defense rate of the
model to 80%. Our proposed Image Fusion(IF) attack has no
effective protection in our known range.From Figure 12,we
can find that the features extracted by convolution already
contain a large amount information of background image B
, and the feature information of the original image has been
seriously damaged.Different from noise, it has obvious distri-
bution characteristics different from the original image. The
background image is almost perfectly fused with the original
image.
7 Related work
Previous works mainly study the security and privacy in DL
models via white-box mode [6, 15, 16, 20]. In the white-
box model, the attacker can obtain the adversarial examples
quickly and accurately. However, it is difficult for the attacker
to know the inner parameters of models in the real world,
so researchers have launched some black-box attacks on DL
models recently such as transfer learning attacks and spatial
transformation attacks.
Transfer learning attacks are first examined by [20], which
study the transferability between different models trained
over the same dataset. [14] propose novel ensemble-based ap-
proaches to generate adversarial example . Their approaches
enable a large portion of targeted adversarial example to trans-
fer among multiple models for the first time.However, transfer
learning attacks have strong limitations, depending on the col-
lection of enough open source models, but for example, there
are not enough open source models for pornographic and
violent image recognition.
Spatial transformation attacks are very interesting, pertur-
bations generated through spatial transformation could result
in large Lp distance measures, but experiments show that such
spatially transformed adversarial examples are perceptually
realistic and more difficult to defend against with existing
defense systems. This potentially provides a new direction
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(a) Original image O (b) Backgroud B (c) Adversarial example ADV
(d) Features of O (e) Features of B (f) Features of ADV
Figure 12: Features of distorted images extracted by VGG19’s first convolutional layer (after max pooling).After image fusion,
the information of O and B is also included in the features of ADV , which leads to confusion in feature extraction(α= 0.2).
in adversarial example generation and the design of corre-
sponding defenses [22]. [9] evaluate the robustness of Google
Cloud Vision API to input perturbation, they show that adding
an average of 14.25% impulse noise is enough to deceive the
API and when a noise filter is applied on input images, the
API generates mostly the same outputs for restored images as
for original images. [23] report the first systematic study on
the real-world adversarial images and their use in online illicit
promotions. [12] make the first attempt to conduct an exten-
sive empirical study of black-box attacks against real-world
cloud-based image detectors such as violence, politician and
pornography detection. We further extend the spatial trans-
formation attack, and choose the four methods which have
the lowest cost to implement. These methods can be imple-
mented without any Deep Learning knowledge and only need
a few lines of OpenCV code, but the attack effect is very re-
markable. Compared with previous work [22], these methods
are more threatening,we call it Simple Transformation (ST)
attacks,including Gaussian Noise, Salt-and-Pepper Noise, Ro-
tation and Monochromatization.We expand their experiment
and use ST to attack models of four cloud-based image classi-
fier services and we propose one novel attack methods, Image
Fusion(IF) attack , which achieve a high bypass rate approx-
imately 90%. Our IF attack can be classified as a spatial
transformation attack .Unlike previous work [5, 22], we also
systematically introduced defense technology and conducted
a lot of experiments based on ImageNet datasets. Experiments
show that our defense technology can effectively resist known
ST attacks.Through experiments, we prove how to choose
different filters in the face of different noises, and how to
choose the parameters of different filters.
8 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we mainly focus on studying the security of
real-world cloud-based image classifier services. Specifically,
We propose one novel attack methods, Image Fusion(IF) at-
tack ,which achieve a high bypass rate ; and we make the
first attempt to conduct an extensive empirical study of black-
box attacks against real-world cloud-based classifier services.
Through evaluations on four popular cloud platforms includ-
ing Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Clarifai, we demonstrate that
ST attack has a success rate of approximately 100% except
Amazon approximately 50%, IF attack has a success rate over
98% among different classifier services. Finally, we discuss
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the possible defenses to address these security challenges
in cloud-based classifier services.Our defense technology is
mainly divided into model training stage and image prepro-
cessing stage.Experiments show that our defense technology
can effectively resist known ST attacks, such as Gaussian
Noise, Salt-and-Pepper Noise, Rotation, and Monochromati-
zation.Through experiments, we prove how to choose differ-
ent filters in the face of different noises, and how to choose
the parameters of different filters.
In the future, we aim to explore the space of adversarial
examples with less perturbation in black-box and attempt to
study targeted attack using IF attack. On the other hand, we
will focus on the defense in the cloud environment, so that AI
services in the cloud environment away from cybercrime.We
hope cloud service providers will not continue to forget this
battlefield.
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(a) α= 0.2 (b) α= 0.4
(c) α= 0.6 (d) α= 0.8
(e) α= 1.0
Figure 13: Confusion matrix of Image Fusion attack under different parameter α.As we can see from the figure, with the increase
of fusion parameter α, the number of correct classifications increases, and the top-1 accuracy increases.
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(a) PSNR (b) SSIM
Figure 14: We increase amount of Salt-and-Pepper Noise Attack from 0.1 to 0.4, ksize of the Median Filter from 3 to 17, the
Figure 14(a) records the PSNR and the Figure 14(b) records the SSIM under different parameters.When the parameters amount
of Salt-and-Pepper Noise Attack are the same, increasing the window size parameters ksize of the Median Filter will reduce the
image similarity and the image quality.
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